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Abstract:
 This study evaluates Jordanian youth’s awareness and perceptions of the constitutional 
amendments of  2011 and explores the youth’s main sources of political news. I hypothesized 
that a majority of young Jordanians are largely uninformed about the amendments and expected 
that the main source of news for most young Jordanians were official media sources. My 
research data consists of survey responses, given by 65 students from the University of Jordan, 
as well as five interviews with young Jordanians. My findings proved that the Jordanian youth 
has a low level of awareness about the recent political reforms, and the main news sources used 
by the youth are government affiliated. I argue that these results are indicative of the limitations 
the youth in Jordan face in the political public sphere. The political public sphere in Jordan 
largely prohibits the ability of citizens to articulate “common concerns,” there is a lack of 
inclusivity and equality within the public sphere, and critical-rational debate is severely limited. 
Therefore, despite the marginal political improvements of the recent constitutional reforms, 
significant political reform is unlikely to develop without a more open and robust political public 
sphere. 
Introduction:
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate Jordanian youth’s awareness and perceptions of 
the constitutional amendments of 2011 and how the youth access political news. From this focal 
point, I plan to draw larger conclusions about the status of the political public sphere in Jordan 
amidst recent political developments. The constitutional reforms, which were formally approved 
by King Abdullah II in a decree issued in September of 2011, were adopted in the wake of 
protests in Jordan. These protests coincided with several protests movements in other Middle 
Eastern countries during the Arab Spring of 2010-2011.1  Included in the forty-two amendments, 
drafted by the Royal Constitutional Committee, were laws that are intended to establish new 
election laws, enhance civil liberties, and limit the power of the monarchy and State Security 
Court.
3
1 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2012 - Jordan,” 22 January 2012, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4f2007d3c.html, accessed 4 May 2012.
 I initially became interested in the Arabic Spring and the topic of political reform in 
Middle Eastern countries while at college in the United States. Many people in the media and 
academia began to argue that the youth were the main impetus for these protests and 
revolutionary movements. However, there seemed to be very limited views on their motivations 
for action and how widespread dissent was amongst the population. I also felt that there did not 
seem to be a general consensus as to how successful these movements had been at achieving real 
political change.  After coming to Jordan, I learned of the constitutional reforms initiated by 
King Abdullah II last Spring, and I thought this recent development would be an excellent topic 
to focus on for my study. 
 Not only is my area of inquiry relevant because it focuses on the very recent political 
developments of the Arab Spring, but also because it specifically addresses a very integral 
segment of Jordan’s population. Currently, the youth in Jordan is the largest segment of the 
country’s population. According to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Higher Council for the 
Youth, as of 2004  people under 30 years of age represent 74% of the total population.2 
Understanding the youth’s awareness of recent political developments and how they are 
informed about politics will offer greater insight into the health of the political process and 
public debate in Jordan as a whole. 
   I hypothesized from the outset of my research that a majority of young 
Jordanians would not be aware or fully understand the constitutional reforms, and those who 
were aware of the reforms were likely to feel that the reforms were not sufficient in achieving 
desired political change. I based my hypothesis on my assumptions that the political public 
4
2 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Higher Council for the Youth, “National Youth Strategy for Jordan 2005-2009,” 
December 2004. 
sphere in Jordan (even in the wake of the recent reforms) was still very limited for young people, 
meaning that most youths would have very little access to political information or political 
activities. I also assumed from the initial stages of my research that those who were aware of the 
reforms were more likely to be informed by official sources, like government-owned or pro-
government media sources, due to the fact that I believed the government had a extremely 
influential role in directing information in the public sphere. I intended to test my hypothesis by 
conducting a survey that asked young Jordanians about the recent constitutional amendments. I 
also planned to supplement my fundings with a few brief interviews. The main goal I hoped to 
achieve with my study was to contextualize the youth’s awareness of the recent political 
developments in order to understand the accessibility of the political public sphere in Jordan.
  With this goal in mind, I plan to use German sociologists Jurgen Habermas’ 
widely influential theory of the “public sphere” from his book The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere (1989) to frame my analysis of the youth’s awareness and access to political 
information and the political process. Habermas’ book chronicles the rise of what he terms the 
“bourgeois public sphere” in the 18th and 19th centuries, during the growth of industrial 
capitalism and shift towards the modern state system in Western Europe. He argues that only 
with the development of the modern state and economy did the notions of  “public” and “private” 
assume their currently recognized form: "public" relating to public authority of the state; 
"private" relating to the economy, society and the family.3  
 According to Habermas, within this new social distinction between the public and the 
private emerged the modern concept of the “public sphere,” which he defines as the sphere of 
5
3 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois 
Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1962 Trans. 1989), 7-11.
“private people” coming together “as a public.”4 Habermas clarifies his definition of the modern 
public sphere, explaining that it is distinguished by the following key characteristics: common 
interests, people engaging in the public sphere share similar “public” concerns; inclusivity, 
generally speaking there are no obstacles barring individuals from engaging the public sphere; 
equality of status, status is largely irrelevant within the public sphere; rational-critical debate, the 
public sphere addresses concerns and arrives at common interests through rational discussions 
and debates. Habermas argues that recently, with the rise in commodification, mass media, and 
the blurring of state and private interests, a process called refuedalization is occurring in which 
the public sphere and rational- critical debate is being replaced by mass media and powerful state 
interests in creating public opinion.5
 For my paper, I  plan to use Habermas’ definition of the public sphere to analyze the 
Jordanian youth’s political awareness and participation in terms of their access to what I will call 
the “political public sphere.” Essentially, I am incorporating all spaces, institutions, and 
processes by which “private” Jordanians learn about, discuss, or engage in political activities or 
developments into my definition of the public sphere. I will use the four key characteristics 
outlined above as a guideline to judge to overall status of the political public sphere in Jordan. 
Finally, I plan to use Habermas’ theory of refeudalization to discuss the Jordanian government’s 
policies of intervening in in the public sphere.
Literature Review:
6
4 Habermas, Structural, 3.
5 Habermas relates this phenomenon with feudalism in Europe during the Middle Ages when the notions of “public” 
and “private” concerns were much more interwoven and political elites including the lords, kings, and religious 
leaders largely dictated and censored “public” perceptions.
Habermas, Structural, 15-17.
 Because my topic deals with very recent political developments in Jordan and focuses on 
a very select population (the youth), I did not encounter many academic resources that dealt 
directly with my area of study. However, I did manage to find literature that offered greater 
insight into key elements of my topic: the political public sphere, which is how I will evaluate 
the youth’s access to political processes in Jordan, and political reform in the Middle East, which 
includes the reform movements in Jordan and the recent constitutional amendments. First, I set 
out to find literature that placed Habermas’ public sphere theory in a Jordanian context. Though 
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere offers a very clear, general theoretical framework for this 
study, his work is historically rooted in the development of modern Europe (and to some extent 
North America). This makes it somewhat problematic to apply his theory to the Middle East, 
which has an entirely different political history. To address this issue, I found literature that used 
the public spheres theory in a Middle Eastern context. 
  Initially, most of the material I found concerning public sphere theory in the Middle East 
was essentially limited to academic discussions about the role of Islam in the modern public 
sphere. Though these articles were very interesting, they did not offer a lot of theoretical or 
factual insight for the purposes of my topic.6 However, I found Marc Lynch’s book State 
Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity (1999) to be a very 
useful guide in contextualizing Habermas’ public sphere theory in Jordan. In his book, Lynch is 
primarily focused on locating the impact Jordanian identity and national interests has on Jordan’s 
foreign policy. Though Lynch is concerned more with the influence the “international public 
sphere” in the Middle East has on Jordanian identity and national interests, he does use 
7
6 For readings on Islam in the public sphere see Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East 
and Europe  or New Media, New Publics: Reconfiguring the Public Sphere of Islam. 
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere to explain the way public opinion and national interests 
are formed within Jordan. I find Lynch’s book particularly helpful because he uses the concept of 
the public sphere to explain the level of accountability that government’s are held to for their 
policy decisions. Lynch explains that in the absence of  “an effective public sphere” it can be 
assumed that the state will enjoy “a considerable amount of autonomy in the definition of the 
national interest.”7 Thus, Lynch’s theory provides not only a basis for applying Habermas’ theory 
of the public sphere to a Middle Eastern context, but also explicitly connects the strength of the 
public sphere to the actions and interests of the government. 
 Similarly, I found Sean L. Yom’s “Society and Democratization in the Arab World 
(2005)”  to be a helpful resource in framing my understanding of the public sphere in Jordan. 
Yom argues that the concept of “civil society”  as it is known in Western Europe and the United 
States does not necessarily apply to societies in the Middle East. Furthermore, Yom states that 
academics who assert “vigorous civic activism” is the main impetus for democratic change fail to 
consider the role of the political regime in controlling or initiating political reform.8 I found parts 
of Yom’s argument to be problematic, as recent political developments across the Middle East 
have shown that vigorous civic activism can actually play a role in creating significant political 
change (Egypt and Tunis for example); however, I believe Yom’s skepticism of the political 
power of civil societies in the “Arab World” complements my discussion of the limited access 
young Jordanians have to the political public sphere.
8
7 Marc Lynch, State Interests and the Public Sphere: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 21.
8 Sean L. Yom, “Society and Democratization in the Arab World,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 
9.4 (2005): 12.
 In addition to looking to sources that put Habermas’ theory in a more accurate 
geographical context, I also looked to critical theorists Nancy Fraser’s book Rethinking Public 
Spheres (1990) to put public sphere theory in a more contemporary context. Fraser explains that 
although Habermas’ theory (which he wrote and first published in 1962) offers a very cohesive 
analysis of public life, recent revisionist historiography has shown that some of Habermas’ 
assumptions are oversimplified. For instance, Fraser believes that historically the public sphere 
has not been fully inclusive and does not disregard status completely as Habermas suggests. 
Fraser explains that several minority groups, especially women and members of lower classes, 
did not have the same access to the public sphere as the male bourgeois because of 
discrimination.9 Fraser also explains that Habermas’ notion of a “common concern” among 
private citizens can be problematic because there are no naturally given “public” or “private” 
concerns.10 Rather, Fraser asserts that issues become common concerns after “sustained 
discursive contestation” in the public sphere.11 Though Fraser raises legitimate criticisms of 
Habermas, I agree with her claim that Habermas’ basic theory is “an indispensable resource.” 12 
Therefore, I plan to take into account Fraser’s criticism of Habermas as I use his theory to frame 
my analysis, particularly in terms of the status of women in the public sphere.
  In addition to the literature that I am using to frame my discussion of the political 
public sphere in Jordan, I also found a few works that offer a very useful analysis of recent 
political reforms and democratization in the Middle East. First, I found Glen E. Robinson’s 
9
9 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Public Spheres:A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy (North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), 58.
10 Fraser, Rethinking, 62.
11Ibid.
12 Fraser, Rethinking, 57.
article “Defensive Democratization in Jordan (1998)” to be extremely useful in interpreting the 
motivations of the Jordanian government in instituting the constitutional reforms. Robinson, 
whose article specifically deals with Jordan’s political-liberalization programs of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, asserts that the Jordanian regime undertook sufficient reforms to “assure its 
political longevity,” without altering the “cores of power in Jordan.” 13 This type of top-down 
reform, which Robinson terms “defensive democratization,” is best understood as “a series of 
pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege while limiting the appeal of more 
fundamental political change.”14 Though Robinson is not commenting on the recent reforms in 
Jordan, I believe that my research will show his concept of “defensive democratization” in many 
respects applies to the recent constitutional reforms of 2011.
 The article, “Arab Monarchies: Chances for Reform, Yet Unmet (2011)” by Marina 
Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, offers a slightly different interpretation of the recent 
constitutional reforms than Robinson’s “defensive democratization” theory, arguing that the 
reform measures taken by the Jordanian government are a positive step, but require amore 
comprehensive strategy. According to Ottaway and Muasher, a majority of Jordanians desire 
greater political and economic reform; however, they want the monarch to lead the reform 
process.15 I found Ottaway and Muasher’s discussion of the reform process to be study are useful 
to my research on the reform movement in Jordan; however, some of my own findings have led 
10
13 Glen E. Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30.3 
(1998): 387.
14Ibid.
15 Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, “Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Washington D.C. (2011): 13.
me to question if a majority of Jordanians active in the reform movement are comfortable with 
the regime leading the reform efforts. 
Methodology:
 Overall, my research experience was very positive and helpful to this study. I was able to 
obtain very useful data from surveys concerning the youth’s awareness of the recent 
constitutional reforms. In addition, my interviews provided greater insight into the youth’s 
participation and perceptions of the reform movement. Initially, I was unsure how willing the 
Jordanians I spoke with would be to delve into their personal opinions about their government 
and the reform movement. However, I found a majority of them to be very candid with their 
views and learned a great deal that helped me frame my analysis. 
 From the outset of my research I decided that my main methodology would be surveying 
young people about their awareness and opinions of the constitutional reforms. I felt that surveys 
would be the best choice for conducting my research because it would allow me to easily obtain 
the views, however brief, of a large group of young Jordanians. I conducted my survey at the 
University of Jordan, with the help of Dr. Ashraf Alqudah, who allowed me to survey students in 
his class. I chose to conduct my survey at Jordan University for a few main reasons that I felt 
would benefit my research. First, conducting a survey in a university classroom will ensure that 
my respondents are what could be classified as “the youth,” meaning that they are old enough to 
give informed consent, but still fall into the 12-30 age bracket (which is the age bracket that 
Jordan’s Higher Council for the Youth uses as age parameters for the youth). Also, I also 
assumed that college-educated youths would likely have a basic level of education and 
knowledge about current events. I surveyed 65 students, which I believed was an ideal survey 
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sample, as my initial hopes were to survey between 50 and 100 students. Finally, because of my 
connections with Dr. Ashraf Alqudah, I knew that it would be easier for me to conduct my survey  
at the University of Jordan without having to go through any other official channels to obtain 
permission.
 I also planned to conduct a few brief interviews to supplement my surveys. I felt that this 
was necessary to my research because surveys alone only provided a shallow picture of the youth 
in Jordan. Most of my survey questions were closed, meaning that the students were asked to 
choose from pre-determined answers. Though I knew that this would be beneficial to me because 
it would reduce the time I would spend translating open-ended answers and allow me to survey a 
larger sample size, I also understood that this would limit the students’ ability to give me in depth 
responses and elaborate on their opinions. Thus, I decided before starting my research that I 
needed to conduct a few interviews to supplement my surveys in order to have a more complete 
picture of the youth and their political awareness.
 For my interviews, I spoke with five individuals. Akram Idrees, Mohammad Zeidan, 
Tayseer Klob, and two Jordanian college students that wished to remain anonymous. I chose to 
interview Akram Idrees because he is active in the reform movement and is a founder of an 
Amman-based debate club. He was an ideal interviewee because not only did he have very 
strong opinions about the reform movement and the political process in Jordan, but he also was 
very active in getting other young people involved in political activities and discussions. 
Similarly, I decided to interview Mohammad Zeidan (who is also my ISP advisor), a free lance 
translator and Arabic teacher who runs a book club in Amman. He is also very informed and 
active in politics and I felt that his experience with running a book club would offer interesting 
12
insight into the youth’s involvement in intellectual activities in Jordan. I also interviewed Tayseer 
Klob, an Islamic reformist, because I wanted to gain a perspective on the reform movement from 
someone who identifies with Islamism. Finally, I chose to interview two college students in order 
to get more in depth opinions from the youth than my surveys alone would allow.
  In order to ensure that my participants would not experience any negative repercussions 
from participating in my research project, I made sure to protect their identities and inform them 
what my research entails and how their assistance would be used. For my interviews (except for 
two, for which I obtained verbal consent) I asked the participants to read and sign an informed 
consent form, which gave a brief description of my project, ensured that their participation was 
optional, their participation could be terminated at any time, the information provided would be 
used for research purposes only, and that they had the right to full anonymity if they wished. I 
also explained to my interviewees that my research was not funded by any outside sources. For 
my surveys, I obtained verbal consent from participants in Dr. Ashraf Alqudah’s class and also 
stated at the top of my survey that participation was optional, participants could stop taking the 
survey at any time, and all data would be used for research purposes. The survey participants 
were not asked to give any identifying information aside from indicating their gender. The actual 
surveys, my notes from my interviews, and the signed informed consent forms were kept in a 
sealed folder and I was the only person to have access to these documents. The only other person 
who looked at the surveys was Talal Al-shoubaki, an SIT language partner, who helped me read 
and translate a small segment of my survey results.
 To protect the validity of my results and to prevent misunderstandings in my data, I 
conducted my interviews in English and conducted my surveys in Arabic. Because I am not 
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fluent in Arabic and knew that expressing complex and perhaps controversial ideas would be 
difficult with a translator, I conducted all of my interviews in English. Every one of my 
interviewees spoke English fluently and I encountered not problems understanding them. For my  
surveys, however, I chose to write the survey and give it to students in Arabic. I was not 
confident that a majority of students would be fluent in English and also felt that even students 
who spoke English would feel more confident answering a survey written in Arabic. In order to 
reduce the time it would spend analyzing the survey results, a majority of the questions were 
closed. The survey, which I wrote in English, was translated into Arabic with the help of my SIT 
Arabic teacher Riham N’aemat and reviewed by Dr. Ashraf Alqudah. 
 Fortunately, I encounter very few obstacles during the course of my research. The bulk of 
my issues in obtaining my data concerned getting in touch with my interviewees and translating 
my survey. It took several attempts to reach my interviewees, some of whom did not live in 
Amman, and was forced to reschedule a couple of my interviews due to scheduling conflicts. 
Translating my survey proved to be somewhat difficult as well. While working with Mrs. 
N’aemat, I discovered that some of the English phrasing I used was difficult to translate into 
Arabic. However, Mrs. N’aemat and Dr. Ashraf helped me edit my survey until I was confident 
that it conveyed the right meaning. Finally, though most of my surveys were filled out correctly, 
a few of my participants did not fully complete their survey. This usually only occurred on the 
few open-ended questions, and I assume that this was due to the fact that the students did not feel 
like answering or because they genuinely did not know what they wanted to say as their answer. 
This did not pose a very big problem, as I just took into account the answers that they did 
provide.
14
  I made a few changes to my original proposal that I believe enhanced the depth of my 
study. Initially, I had intended to interview academics and journalists from official media sources 
to discuss the youth’s perceptions of politics and the youth’s political activity. However, after 
some consideration I changed the focus of my interviews, deciding instead to interview young 
people to comment on their own opinions and their opinion of their peers. I felt that this would 
better supplement my surveys. As previously stated, my surveys did not allow for participants to 
respond to open-ended questions. Therefore, I was getting a very limited, somewhat shallow 
view of their perspective. Interviewing young people, especially those who were politically 
active, provided me with a more in depth insight into the youth’s perspective on politics.Thus, I 
felt that though my interviews with academics and media sources would have provide an 
interesting view of the youth, I decided that I wanted to focus my research primarily on the views 
from the youth. However, I did use other sources (articles, statistics, etc.) to obtained a more 
informed understanding of the Jordanian youth in general. 
 The only other change that I made from my original plan was to distribute my survey in 
Arabic only. Initially, I had planned to bring copies of the survey in English and in Arabic to the 
university; however, I decided to only provide the Arabic draft of my survey. As stated earlier, I 
felt that this was the most effective way to conduct the survey because I felt the students would 
be more comfortable answering the survey in their first language. 
Findings:
Brief Background
 The forty-two constitutional amendments which I asked the participants about in my 
survey were initiated by the Jordanian government as part of a larger process of addressing 
15
protestors demands during the early stages of the Arab Spring. Demonstrations in Jordan, 
inspired by events in Tunis and Egypt, broke out in January and February of 2011. King 
Abdullah II replaced the prime minister and ordered the newly appointed prime minister, Marouf 
al-Bakhit, to initiate political and economic reforms. This included the creation of a national 
dialogue committee in March and the establishment of a royal constitutional committee in April. 
The committee proposed forty-two constitutional amendments, which were later approved by 
both houses of parliament and King Abdullah II in September. 16 
 The amendments addressed several issues put forth by reform groups. One of the 
amendments called for the creation of a constitutional court to monitor the constitutionality of 
laws and regulations. In addition, the reforms established an independent electoral commission to 
replace the Ministry of the Interior in organizing elections. The amendments also established 
new laws regarding civil liberties including the prohibition of torture and the classification of all 
forms of communications between Jordanian citizens as private and immune from censorship or 
confiscation. Finally, the amendments revoked the government’s ability to issue temporary laws 
during the absence of parliament and limited the State Security Court’s jurisdiction to cases of 
treason, terrorism, or espionage.17
Survey Results
 To find out the youth’s awareness and perceptions of these constitutional amendments, I 
conducted a survey at the University of Jordan and interviewed two college students. Of the two 
college students that I interviewed, one male (age 18) and one female (age 19), only the male 
16
16 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2012.”
17 Ottaway, “Arab Monarchies,” 11.
student was aware of the reforms.18 The female student was not aware of the reforms and said 
that she “rarely” follows political news.19 In my survey, I asked 65 students if they were aware of 
the amendments, if they agreed with the reforms, and if they thought the reforms were sufficient. 
I also asked the participants to indicate where they learned about the reforms and political news 
in general. Of the 65 students asked, 22 students responded that they were aware of the 
amendments and 43 responded that they were not aware of the amendments. When these 
responses were broken down by gender, I found that of the 10 male participants, 5 were aware of 
the reforms. Of the 55 female respondents, 17 were aware of the amendments. These results, 
which are depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, show that overall awareness of the 
constitutional reforms is approximately 34%. Male awareness is higher, 50%, and female 
awareness is slightly lower, approximately 31%. 
Figure 1




18 Male College Student, Interviewed by Krista Vendetti, April 19. 2012.
19 Female College Student, Interviewed by Krista Vendetti, April 19, 2012.
Figure 2
Figure 3
Males Aware of Amendments Males Unaware
50% 50%




! Of the respondents who were aware of the amendments, approximately 68% agreed (12 
people) or strongly agreed (3 people) with the reforms. Approximately 27% did not agree (4 
people) or disagreed strongly (2 people) with the reforms, while one respondent did not answer. 
(See Figure 4 below).!
Figure 4
 
 The male college student that I spoke with, agreed, like a majority of the young people 
surveyed, with the reforms. When asked to elaborate why he agreed with the reforms he said that 
even though the reforms are “not perfect,” they are still good changes because at least “they are 
changes.”20 The survey respondents seemed to agree with this male student that the reforms are 
“not perfect,” as no respondent said yes when asked if they thought the amendments were 
sufficient political reform. Approximately 45% (10 people) said no, the reforms are not 








20 Male Student, Interview.
sufficient. Nine respondents, around 41%, said that they were not able determine if the reforms 
were adequate and three respondents did not answer this question. 
Figure 5
 When asked how they were informed about the constitutional amendments and political 
news in general, respondents listed a variety of news sources. The top eight news sources are 
shown on the following page in Figure 6. As you can see, the three main sources of news the 
participants listed are the Al Ra’ai newspaper (18%), run by the government-owned Jordan Press 
Foundation; the Ad-Dustour newspaper (18%), owned by the Jordan Press and Publishing 
Company (which the Jordanian government owns shares in); and the news program, Al Akhbar 
(18%), on the government-owned Jordan Radio and Television Corporation.21 These sources are 
followed closely by the Al Ghad newspaper (15%), an independent daily paper owned by the 







21 Jordan Radio and Television Corporation Website, http://jrtv.gov.jo/Arabic/AboutJOTv/Pages/
MissionandVision.aspx, accessed April 22, 2012.
United Jordan Press Company, friends (12%), and teachers (12%). Finally, 5% of respondents 
cited Al Jazeera as a source of political news and only 2% of respondents listed relatives/
family.22 
 From these results it can be inferred that a majority of young Jordanians are not aware of 
the recent constitutional reforms. It can also be inferred that, among young Jordanians who do 
know of the amendments, a majority of them agree with political reform (68% of my survey 
respondents agreed) and significant portion of them believe their needs to be further reforms 









Teachers Al Ghad Al Jazeera Ad-Dustour                                      
Al Raʼ ai JRTV Al Akhbar Relatives Friends
21
22 Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press 2011 - Jordan,” 23 September 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4e7c84f328.html, accessed 4 May 2012.
know if they believe the reforms are sufficient. These results offer interesting insights into the 
status of the public sphere in Jordan.
  According to Lynch, citizens ability to “articulate and express” their interests and 
opinions in the public sphere depends on the institutional means for such expression.”23 I believe 
that the lack of awareness of young Jordanians of the recent constitutional reforms, their beliefs 
that the reforms are not sufficient, and even their inability or unwillingness to state their opinion 
on the efficiency of the reforms shows that the youth are only able to articulate and express their 
political opinions and concerns within a very limited public sphere. I will evaluate Jordan’s 
political public sphere to more clearly demonstrate the constraints on the youth’s access using the 
four main characteristics of the public sphere outlined by Habermas: common interests, 
inclusivity, equal status, and critical-rational debate. 
Barriers to the “Common Interest”
 According to Habermas, the ability of private persons to publicly discuss and 
“problematize” common concerns is a key component of a healthy public sphere. He explains 
that private people are more able to demand that the state address their issues based on the 
authority of their mutual concerns.24 In the case of Jordan, I discovered through my research that 
a main barrier to the development of what Habermas would call “common interests” is the 
decentralized political structure of Jordan.
 Jordan has historically been comprised of numerous tribes and ethnic groups that were 
consolidated by a centralized, bureaucratic government; however, Jordan has over the last couple 
of decades become increasingly politically fragmented because of initiatives imposed by the 
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government. During the later years of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Jordanian government 
initiated political and economic liberalization programs. These reforms were prompted by series 
of bloody riots that broke out initially in the southern city of Ma’an in 1989 after the government 
had cut subsidies and other types of welfare payments in a structural-adjustment agreement with 
the IMF, which led to a sharp rise in the price of several basic commodities.25 In the aftermath of 
the riots, King Hussein called for new parliamentary elections; however, political parties were 
still banned until 1992 and even then were expressly forbidden from having financial or 
organizational ties to any outside bodies. This clause on the financial funding was implicitly 
aimed at diminishing the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and pan-Arabist parties that 
existed in other Middle Eastern countries. These parties could be considered to be “tied to 
outside bodies” and prevented from participating in Jordanian elections  Finally, before the 1993 
elections, the government adopted the “one-person, one-vote system.”26 Glen E. Robinson 
explains the political significance of this new electoral law: 
In prior elections, each citizen could vote for as many candidates as there were 
seats in the electoral district... [e]ach voter in Jordan had between two to nine 
votes to distribute among candidates in [their] district. It was widely believed 
that the impact of this system in the 1989 elections was the election of more 
“ideological” candidates- Islamists and leftists- as people could cast their “first” 
vote for a clan member and then cast their “second” vote on ideological 
grounds... Making voters choose between these was rightly seen by the 
government to favor tribal gatherings at the expense of political parties.27 
 Thus, as Robinson explains, these new election laws were a means by which the 
government diffused the power of Islamic or leftists parties and solidified decentralized, tribal 
political ties. Mr. Akram Idrees, a political reformist and leader of an Amman debate club, agrees 
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that the election laws of 1989 and 1993 significantly fragmented Jordan’s political society.  Mr. 
Idrees stated that the regime “worked to segment” Jordanian society and consequently tribal 
influence and power in the political process is “getting worse.”28 Mr. Zeidan, a free-lance 
translator and founder of an Amman-based book club, also agrees that tribalism is “stronger than 
ever in Jordan.”29
 The political identification with tribal affiliation, which has by many accounts become 
significantly worse over recent years, is a clear barrier to the development of strong national or 
party-affiliated interests or platforms. According to Islamic reformist, Tayseer Klob, this is 
precisely the issue the reform movement is facing right now in Jordan. Mr. Klob , explains that 
while many Jordanians are concerned with single issues that “affect them directly”- including 
nationality laws, gender discrimination, labor union rights- they are not able to see the systemic 
political crisis that cause all of these problems. For example, he cited the recent electrical 
workers’ strike and the teachers’ strike as examples of how widespread corruption and unfair 
political and economic policies are not understood and acted upon collectively. Rather, each 
affected group is concerned with the political issue that affects them personally. He concludes 
that within this climate of political decentralization and single-issue movements, it is difficult to 
raise awareness and gain support for significant political and economic reform. 30 
 Thus, the ability of Jordanians to actively determine, verbalize, and act upon “common 
concerns” on a national level is limited. The election laws of 1993 in particular created political 
decentralization in Jordan, which had caused tribal affiliation to become the most prominent 
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political identity. In addition, past and present laws concerning parties diffused the power of 
these political groups to participate in government. These political realities make it extremely 
difficult to develop cohesive, politically salient “common concerns” in the Jordanian public 
sphere. Political and economic problems are more generally broken down into single-issue 
movements that are discussed and acted upon by relatively small segments of the population. 
The Obstacles to “Inclusivity” and  Equality of “ Status” 
 The other key characteristics of the public sphere, according to Habermas, is the inclusive 
nature of the public sphere. However exclusive certain aspects of the public might be in a given 
instance, the public sphere is never entirely closed off to all private citizens that wish to 
participate. Furthermore, the public sphere “disregards status” in that no matter a private person’s 
status, they enjoy a degree of social equality in terms of their ability to share ideas, gain 
information, or participate in the public sphere.31 In Jordan, the youth in particular are faced with 
significant obstacles to the political public sphere because of social and political realities that 
diminish inclusivity and equality of status. 
 The Jordanian government has up until very recently, made it very difficult to publicly 
organize for even non-political gatherings. The Public Gatherings Law, which required 
government permission to hold public meetings or demonstrations was only amended in March 
of 2011.32 Mr. Idrees’s experience as a founder of an Amman-based debate club exemplifies the 
ramifications of these policies. According to Mr. Idrees, it was still very difficult for him and his 
colleagues to establish their debate club that he in Amman, even after the Public Gatherings Law 
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was amended. He explains that at all of his debates the police register the names of everyone 
participating, including people are merely part of the audience. 33 
 Mr. Idrees believes that this kind of government action make it difficult to get young 
Jordanians involved in public activities like the debate club because they are apprehensive of 
being “in the system” or of being affiliated with political or subversive groups. After evaluating 
the statistics on youth involvement in community clubs or activities, it is apparent that young 
Jordanians indeed seem reluctant to engage in the public sphere. According to the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan Higher Council for the Youth, less than 10% of Jordanians participate in civil 
society organizations (like student councils, profession organizations, and political parties), while 
only 1.2% of the survey sample listed “youth clubs/organizations” as a preferred activity.34 
Clearly, Jordanian youths are to a large extent excluding themselves from participating in 
institutions in the public sphere, whether they be political or not. I believe that many of the 
causes of this self-exclusion are rooted in restrictive government policies and the apprehension 
and apathy that they have bred. 
 It is also important to note that women in particular are in many ways socially, 
economically, and politically excluded from the public sphere. According to the Higher Council 
for the Youth, young women in Jordan “experience significantly more restrictions” on their 
mobility than young men, as women are largely confined to activities “within education and the 
home.” Economically speaking, women in Jordan have very limited opportunities. Reportedly, 
almost two-thirds of females 15 and older are housewives and female unemployment is nearly 
three times higher than male unemployment. Part of the reason women seem to experience more 
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restricted mobility seems to be the social views about women and women’s roles. According to 
the Higher Council for the Youth, Jordanians believe “rather unanimously” that husbands/fathers 
should provide family incomes and wives/mother should have the prime responsibility for 
housework and childcare.35 Politically, women also are sheltered from the public sphere. 
According to Mr. Idrees and Mr. Klob, women are generally less involved in protests and reform 
demonstrations. Mr. Idrees noted that while women are a significant portion of the debate 
audiences, they usually only comprise about 10-20% of the people at demonstrations.36 Mr. Klob 
similarly noted that women were not usually present for most of the reform protests, he felt in 
large part due to concerns for their safety.37
 Not only do women in Jordan face exclusions to the public sphere, but they also do not 
enjoy equal status with men in the public sphere. The most glaring example of this ties directly 
with the recent constitutional amendments. Reformers had demanded that The Royal 
Constitutional Committee revise article 6, which prohibits discrimination based on race, 
language, or religion, to include gender. However, the final draft did not include this revision.38 
Another example of women’s unequal status before the law is Jordan’s nationality law, which 
allows a man to pass his nationality to a foreign-born spouse and his children, but denies women 
this same right.39 However, women’s unequal status is not only legally, but also seems to be 
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somewhat socially accepted. The Higher Council for the Youth reported that 45.6% of males 
surveyed and 25.8% of females surveyed believe that women are not equal to men. 
 Thus, the political public sphere in Jordan faces significant problems in terms of its 
inclusivity and equality. In general, government policies have strongly discouraged young 
Jordanians from engaging in public activities, and women in particular experience significant 
economic, social, and political exclusion from the public sphere and are legally and socially 
unequal to men in the public sphere. I believe that these barriers to inclusivity and equality in the 
public sphere help explain my survey respondents lack of awareness of the constitutional 
reforms, as approximately two-thirds of my respondents were unaware of the recent 
constitutional reforms, with women having a higher rate of unawareness (69%) compare to men 
(50%). Essentially, I think it is understandable that young Jordanians, especially women, they do 
not follow or know of specific political developments because the political public sphere, where 
this information is available, is somewhat exclusionary and unequal. 
Stifled Critical-Rational Debate: The Jordanian Experience of “Refuedalization” 
 According to Habermas, critical-rational debate is a vital component of the public sphere 
because it is through critical debate that private citizens discuss and verbalize common concerns 
and form “public opinion.” However, Habermas notes that when state and private interests are 
blurred, a process called refuedalization occurs in which the public sphere and rational- critical 
debate is replaced by mass media and powerful state interests in creating public opinion. 40 I 
believe Jordan, in its own way, is experiencing this process of refeudalization because laws 
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concerning freedom of press and freedom of speech, as well as the government’s influence in 
mass media severely limits critical-rational debate. 
  Jordanian law imposes many limitations on speech and the press. Jordan criminalizes 
speech critical of the King, government officials and institutions, Islam, and speech deemed 
insulting to other persons. In 2010 a revision of the penal code increased penalties for some 
speech offense, and the 2010 Law on Information System Crimes extended these provisions to 
online expressions. The Press and Publication Law allows for fines of almost $40,000 for speech 
that denigrates the government or religion. Furthermore, Journalists must belong to the Jordan 
Association to work legally, and those who are critical of the government have sometimes been 
excluded from this organization. The association does not include journalists who are working 
for internet-based news outlets, leaving them with limited legal protections. 41 
 Recently, there have been new laws or revisions of laws concerning freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press. For example, in 2010 the government dropped clauses from the law 
that allowed for warrantless police searches at online media outlets. In addition, the 
constitutional reforms of 2011included a clause that stated that any form of communication 
between citizens is private, and not subject to censorship or confiscation. The constitutional 
amendments also stated that violations of the law would be tried by civil courts, not the military-
run State Security Court, which is now only supposed to try cases of treason, espionage, and 
terrorism. 
 Yet, these changes have not necessarily meant an increase in speech or journalistic 
freedoms.42 For example, a journalist for the Gerasa News, Jamal Al-Mutaseb, is currently set to 
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be tried by the State Security Court in connection with his coverage of a corruption investigation. 
According to Reporters Without Borders, Al-Mutaseb was arrested after quoting an unnamed 
parliamentarian as saying that he had been given royal directives not to indict the former 
government minister in the “Sakan Karim” corruption case. According to the stipulations of the 
recent amendments, Al-Mutaseb’s speech should be protected under the Jordanian constitution 
and he should not be tried by the State Security Court but by a civilian court.43 Mr. Klob also 
mentioned this case as indicative of the fact that despite these new supposed reforms, journalistic 
freedoms and free speech is still severely limited in Jordan. Mr. Klob says that even in alternative 
spaces like social media sites and online outlets where people feel more free to express their 
opinions, there is still a risk of being censored or punished.44
 There is also the issue of the government’s pervasive role in mass media, as many of the 
major news outlets in Jordan are partially or fully owned by the government. One of the main 
television news programs in Jordan, Al Ahkbar, is run by JRTV, which is owned by the Jordanian 
government. Indeed, on the JRTV’s website it explicitly states that one of its “core values” is 
“loyalty” to “the nation and the king.”45 Many major newspapers in Jordan have similar ties to 
the government. The popular daily newspaper, Al Ra’ai is run by the government-owned Jordan 
Press Foundation, and the government also holds shares in another major newspaper Ad-Dustour. 
These media sources were all listed as top sources of news by the respondents of my survey, 
indicating that a large number of young Jordanians receive their political news from government 
influenced and regulated sources. 
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 Thus, I believe it is accurate to say that in the Jordanian context, there are severe 
limitations to the ability of young citizens to engage in critical-rational debate. Jordanian press 
and speech laws make it difficult to offer critical perspectives to the public sphere, and even new 
laws designed to further protect these freedoms can still be side-stepped by the government in 
their interpretations of these laws. Furthermore, the pervasive role that the government plays in 
mass media suggests that the Jordanian sphere is experiencing what Habermas calls 
“refuedalization” in that the state has the power to influence public opinion. 
Conclusion:
 In conclusion, I believe my findings have shown that my initial assumptions were correct. 
Young Jordanians have low levels of awareness of the recent constitutional reforms and they do 
get a lot of their political information from official media sources.  As I have argued in the 
previous section, I interpreted these results to mean that the political public sphere in Jordan is 
severely limited in several key ways. First, political decentralization, cause in large part by 
previous election and political party laws, has seriously inhibited the ability of Jordanians to 
articulate national common concerns. In addition, government laws concerning public 
organizations as well as policies and social attitudes towards women have made the public 
sphere somewhat exclusive and unequal. Finally, restrictions on press and speech freedoms as 
well as the government’s influence in the media has greatly limited critical-rational debate in 
Jordan. Although there are doubtlessly exceptions to these findings, I believe overall my research 
proves that in many respects, young Jordanians have limited access to the political public sphere 
and are therefore less likely to be very active or informed about politics. 
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 The results of this study imply that the recent constitutional reforms, although intended 
and thought of by many as a sign of significant political progress in Jordan, are not necessarily a 
sign of greater political reform or democracy in Jordan. Clearly, even some of the most valuable 
reforms, like the relegation of legal cases to the civilian courts instead of the State Security 
Court, are not being implemented in ways that increase the political freedoms of Jordanians. I 
conclude, similarly to Robinson’s interpretation of the political and economic reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s, that the constitutional amendments of 2011 were largely initiated by the 
government as a way to appease emerging protest movements while still maintaining much of its 
power. That is not to say that the reform movements in Jordan are not important or cannot 
produce actual and significant political results. Clearly, the fact that Jordanians are engaged in 
reform movements or protests even at a limited level show that spaces do exist where Jordanians 
can engage in the political public sphere. However, I do believe that the reform movement in 
Jordan is definitely stifled because of the limits imposed on the political public sphere by the 
government.
 Although I  believe that these implications can be drawn from my study, there are still a 
variety of further questions that arose from my findings. First of all, I think that my research 
raises questions about the the legal and governmental systems in Jordan, specifically how laws 
are actually produced, passed through parliament, and then interpreted by the courts (especially 
the State Security Court). This is especially relevant to understanding recent reforms in Jordan. 
In addition, I think my research also led me to more specific questions about the youth in Jordan. 
For instance, I became curious as to the youth’s opinion about women’s inequality of status. Do 
most young Jordanians agree with the dominant legal and social realities that women should not 
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have the same rights as men, or is this younger generation more attune with notions of gender 
equality? Also, after seeing that most young Jordanians are not extremely active or interested in 
political life, I began to wonder what their primary interests and concerns are: for example, are 
they more concerned with their education, their economic status, marriage? I think the answers to 
these questions would offer a more complete picture of the youth in Jordan and the way they 
relate to their political system. 
Study Limitations:
 Although I feel that my research may offer insight into the awareness and perceptions of 
the Jordanian youth, there are couple important limitations to my study. First of all, though I feel 
that I collected enough survey responses to make a few conclusions that corroborated my other 
research, my sample size was relatively limited. In reality, 65 respondents is not representative of 
the whole Jordanian youth. Thus, even though I feel my survey results were reflective of realities 
that I found in my research, I admit that they may not represent the youth with complete 
accuracy. Furthermore, as the Arab Spring, and the reform movement in Jordan more 
specifically, is still a relatively recent phenomenon, it is possible that some of the ramifications 
of these events are not yet easy to observe or research. Although I feel that my research shows 
that even in the wake of the reforms the political public sphere in Jordan is still limited, there 
may be wider, more subtle effects of the Arab Spring that I was not able to detect. 
Recommendations for Further Studies:
 To address some of these limitations, and to expand upon the findings of my ISP, I 
recommend further inquiry into the reform movement in Jordan and Jordanian’s political system. 
I believe a thorough study of the Jordanian reform movement would offer a great deal more 
33
insight into the effects of the Arab Spring in Jordan. In addition, I think it is important to explore 
the alternative spaces that Jordanians use to engage with the public sphere, like social media sites 
or informal groups/networks, in order to counteract the restrictions on more traditional 
institutions of  public sphere like print newspapers or television programs.  Finally, I think 
understanding aspects of the Jordanian educational system and the way political science is taught 
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Appendix A: Written Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
Jordanian Youth’s Political Awareness and Perceptions of Reform in Post-Arab 
Spring Era
Krista Vendetti,Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York, United States
School for International Training – Jordan: Modernization and Social Change
Instructions:
Please read the following statements carefully and mark your preferences where 
indicated.  Signing below indicates your agreement with all statements and your 
voluntary participation in the project. Please ask the researcher if you have any 
questions regarding this consent form.
I am aware that this interview/survey is conducted by an independent 
undergraduate researcher with the goal of evaluating the Jordanian Youth’s 
opinions and awareness of the 2011 constitutional reforms. 
I am aware that the information I provide is for research purposes only.
I am aware that I have the right to full anonymity upon request, and that upon 
request the researcher will omit all identifying information from both notes and 
drafts. 
I am aware that I have the right to refuse to answer any question and to 
terminate my participation at any time, and that the researcher will answer any 
questions I have about the study.
I am aware of and take full responsibility for any risk, physical, psychological, 
legal, or social, associated with participation in this study.
I am aware that I will not receive monetary compensation for participation in 
this study, but a copy of the final study will be made available to me upon 
request.
I [ do / do not ] give the researcher permission to use my name and position in 
the final study.
I [ do / do not ] give the researcher permission to use my organizational 
affiliation in the final study.
37
I [ do / do not ] give the researcher permission to use data collected in this 
interview in a later study.




Researcher’s Signature    Participant’s Printed Name
_______________________________ 
 _______________________________
Thank you for participating!
Questions, comments, complaints, and requests for the final written study can 
be directed to:
Dr. Raed Al-Tabini, Mokhtar Bouba, SIT Jordan Academic Director





Program: SIT Jordan: Modernization and Social Change
Survey: Jordan Constitutional Reforms 2011
Please Note that Participation in this Survey is Optional!
1. Are you aware of the 42 Constitutional Amendments that were approved last year?
 -------  yes! !  --------- no! !  
2. Where/From who did you learn about these Amendments to the Constitution? (Check 
all that apply)
  -------- newspaper: please specify which paper (s):
 -------  television program: please specify which program (s):
  -------- radio program: please specify which program (s):
 --------- relative/friend/teacher: please specify:
2. Overall, are you in agreement with the proposed amendments?
 ----strongly agree!  ----somewhat agree   -----somewhat disagree    ---- strongly
disagree!
!
3. Please list the three amendments that you feel are most important to you:
a.     --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c.   ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Do you identify with the citizens that called for these reforms?
39
 ------ Not at all!   --------Somewhat ! !  --------Very much so
4. Do you believe further reforms are needed?
 -------yes ! !  ---------no! !  --------- I donʼt know
5. Do you usually follow politics/ political news?
 ------- constantly (several times a week)
 ------- often (1-2 times a week)
 ------- sometimes (1or 2 every couple of weeks)
 ------- rarely (once or less a month)
 ------- never
6. How are you informed about politics/political news? (please check all that apply)
  -------- newspaper: please specify which paper (s):
 -------  television program: please specify which program (s):
  -------- radio program: please specify which program (s):
 --------- relative/friend/teacher: please specify:
7. Please specify your gender: (optional)
 -------male! !   -------- female
Thank You for your participation
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